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TraumaAbstract Entre juin et aouˆt 2011, International Medical Corps a de´ploye´ un hoˆpital de terrain pre`s
de la ligne de front des combats entre les troupes du gouvernement et les opposants en Lybie
occidentale. L’hoˆpital de terrain a pris en charge 1300 combattants et non combattants des deux
camps du conﬂit au cours de cette pe´riode, la plupart d’entre eux pre´sentant des blessures de guerre.
Plus de 60% des blessures lie´es aux combats e´taient des blessures dues a` des e´clats d’obus et a` des
explosions provenant de petits mortiers, un faible pourcentage e´tant duˆ a` des accidents de ve´hicules
motorise´s, a` des blessures par balles, des bruˆlures et autres causes. Les lec¸ons les plus pertinentes
tire´es de notre expe´rience e´taient l’importance de consacrer des ressources signiﬁcatives a` la logis-
tique et a` la gestion de la chaıˆne d’approvisionnement, les bienfaits engrange´s en de´veloppant de
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ne´cessite´ de preˆter attention aux principes e´le´mentaires de l’e´thique humanitaire.
ª 2012 African Federation for Emergency Medicine. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.African relevance
 Civil conﬂict necessitating humanitarian response often
occurs in Africa.
 Humanitarian organizations should respond in a practical
and appropriate manner.
 Community support is essential to humanitarian aid
programs.
 The great diversity in Africa highlights the importance of
impartial aid delivery.
 Medical support systems are often unreliable in areas of
conﬂict.Introduction
In February 2011, after more than four decades under the con-
tinuous rule of Colonel Muammar al-Gaddaﬁ, the people of
Libya began to push for regime change. The uprising began
in the eastern city of Benghazi, but rapidly spread to areas
within western Libya, including Misurata, Zawiya and the
Nafusa Mountains region. Colonel Gaddaﬁ’s government
responded, instructing troops and supporters to quell the
uprising, thus pushing the country into civil war. Although
opposition forces would eventually achieve their goal of
removing him from power, it would come only at great human
and economic cost. Though precise morbidity and mortality
data are not available, the National Transitional Council esti-
mated that as many as 30,000 people were killed and 50,000 in-
jured during the 6 months of ﬁghting.1
As physicians working in Libya during this time with the
humanitarian aid organization International Medical Corps, a
US-based, global, non-proﬁt agency with extensive experience
in complex emergencies,2 we witnessed many of the direct hu-
man costs ﬁrst-hand. Our role in Libya was conceptually sim-
ple: set up and manage the operations of a ﬁeld hospital on
one of the most active front-lines of the conﬂict. However, thework was anything but simple, and required constant rethink-
ing and retooling of plans and approaches that are traditionally
used both by physicians and humanitarian workers alike.
There is little published literature regarding recommenda-
tions on how humanitarian organizations should conduct the
operations of a ﬁeld hospital on the ground during complex
humanitarian emergencies; it is likely that the political and
social complexity of civil war precludes the establishment of
standard universal guidelines. The World Health Organization
guide on the use of foreign ﬁeld hospitals in disasters focuses
on natural, sudden-onset disasters, which is certainly unlike
the situation faced in Libya. As an example, as per WHO rec-
ommendations, we were able to construct the ﬁeld hospital as a
mobile, self-contained unit; however rather that being totally
self sufﬁcient, we necessarily relied heavily on local input and
participation for our operations.3
Field hospital description
The International Medical Corps ﬁeld hospital was initially set
up in the small town of Dafnia, 30 km west of Misurata and
4 km east of the front line. We installed the ﬁeld hospital in
an old farmhouse, both to have adequate space to work in
and to have some protection from any mortars that may land
nearby. The goal of this hospital was twofold: (1) to treat and
send home patients with minor wounds, thus off-loading other
area health facilities and (2) to stabilize critically injured
patients who would subsequently be transferred to the major
receiving hospitals in Misurata.
In spite of the rudimentary structure in which we func-
tioned, our capabilities were remarkably sophisticated. We
had the ability to perform several invasive procedures such as
intubations and chest tube placements and had high-tech diag-
nostic capabilities such as X-ray and ultrasound. The ﬁeld hos-
pital also housed an operating theatre that was utilized on a
selective basis for patients not expected to survive the 30-min-
ute transfer time to Misurata without deﬁnitive care. Our staff
numbers ﬂuctuated somewhat over time, but generally included
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experience, 3–6 local Libyan physicians of various specialties,
and 4–8 nurses. With this workforce the hospital treated over
1300 patients in the 2 months between June 18 and August 19.
Field hospital case mix
In the 8-week period between June 18 and August 11 for which
comprehensive data is available, the International Medical
Corps ﬁeld hospital treated 1167 patients, including 869 new
patients and 298 follow-up visits. While this represents an
average of 21 patient visits per day, the daily logs varied from
6 patients to 130 patients, depending on the intensity of ﬁght-
ing at the time. Combat tended to be heavier during the early
morning and evening hours, likely due to the fact that it was
difﬁcult to ﬁght during the intense heat of mid-day.
Very few civilians presented for care at the hospital, reﬂect-
ing the ﬂight of this population from the area surrounding
Dafnia as the ﬁghting had intensiﬁed in the weeks prior to
our arrival. The vast majority of patients were combatants
from the revolution who were seen for battle related trauma,
including both penetrating trauma from gun shot wounds or
exploding ordinance and blunt trauma from battle related mo-
tor vehicle accidents. The majority of patients treated fell into
the category of ‘‘walking wounded,’’ often with secondary
blast injuries due to shrapnel from exploded mortars. All told,
of the 869 primary visits, 694 patients (80%) were discharged
home and were advised not to return to the front line, although
we anecdotally learned that they often returned to combat
immediately despite our recommendations.
After treatment at the ﬁeld hospital, 161 (18%) were trans-
ferred to a referral hospital for deﬁnitive care, 8 (1%) were
held for observation or had major operations at the ﬁeld hos-
pital, and 6 (1%) died. About 2/3 of new visits to the ﬁeld hos-
pital were due to battle-related trauma, with the remainder due
to medical, psychiatric, on non battle-related trauma. Of the
visits for battle-related trauma, 63% were due to blast injuries
with or without shrapnel, 5% were due to battle-related road
trafﬁc accidents, 4% were due to burns, 2% were due to gun
shot wounds, and 26% were due to other causes. Fig. 1 below
provides a breakdown of all visits by type.
Discussion
Hospital management is always a complex enterprise, and no
place more so than in an active combat zone. However, thereFig. 1 Visits by type.are several important lessons that can be drawn based on our
experience in Libya which we believe may be applicable to ﬁeld
hospitals operating in similar settings in other parts of Africa
or the developing world.
The patient-care activities of medical personnel is extremely
important, but is only part of the work that is involved in ﬁeld
hospital operations; without strong logistical support and sup-
ply chain management the hospital will not be able to provide
quality care for patients and may actually worsen outcomes
by delaying transfer to a facility that can adequately manage
patient needs. Ensuring adequate stocks of medication and sup-
plies during a complex political emergency can be extraordi-
narily difﬁcult due to communication and transportation
constraints within country as well as importation barriers. In
addition, the rapidly shifting context of an active war may
require packing up and moving the ﬁeld hospital, as we had
to do twice, which requires signiﬁcant human, monetary, and
logistical resources to accomplish.
Second, community support is vital in any global health
project, and the generosity of our Libyan hosts with donations
of time, labor, and supplies was critical to the success of our
ﬁeld hospital. Though the hospital was managed by Interna-
tional Medical Corps, a signiﬁcant percentage of staff and vol-
unteers were Libyan. In addition, local Libyan individuals,
hospitals, and pharmacies donated much of the supplies and
medications used at the ﬁeld hospital. This was important
for several reasons. Local Libyan support lent legitimacy to
the ﬁeld hospital and also helped advertise its presence, so that
injured patients were taken there preferentially instead of
attempting to drive them to more distant clinics and hospitals.
Perhaps more importantly though, the insecurity of Libya at
that time made it difﬁcult (and dangerous) to recruit large
numbers of expatriate volunteers, and the lack of a functioning
airport or shipping port made it difﬁcult to import large quan-
tities of medications and supplies from abroad.
Third, while strict adherence to humanitarian principles can
often be difﬁcult in these contexts, upholding the basic ethical
principles of humanitarianism, as enshrined in the Red Cross/
Red Crescent Code of Conduct,4 remains vitally important. In
the Libyan conﬂict, as in many similar conﬂicts, there was a
clear front-line, and you could only place your ﬁeld hospital
on one side of it or the other, as it certainly was not safe to
place it in the middle. The decision of which side to place
the ﬁeld hospital was made for us, as the Transitional National
Council gave us access to areas under their control while the
Libyan government did not.
Due to our location, we ended up treating far more oppo-
sition ﬁghters than government soldiers. However, we treated
combatants and non-combatants from both sides of the con-
ﬂict with the same degree of dedication and compassion, tak-
ing extra care to ensure that wounded troops loyal to Colonel
Gaddaﬁ received appropriate care when they had to be trans-
ferred to referral hospitals in Misurata, in order to preserve
equality of treatment for wounded soldiers from both sides.
Our Libyan counterparts held the utmost respect for this prin-
ciple as well, as was also described in other areas of Libya
during this conﬂict.5 All told, the IMC ﬁeld hospital treated
hundreds of trauma victims over 2 months in Libya, and
our experience highlights the necessity of adaptive planning,
the requirement for ﬂexibility in medical practice, and the
importance of strong community support in humanitarian
assistance.
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Libya.Appendix A. Short answer questions
1. Establishing community support for a global health project
is important because it
a) Guarantees free donation of goods and supplies to the
project
b) Prevents the theft of materials from the organization
c) Lends legitimacy to the project and to the humanitarian
aid workers
d) Allows an organization to act however they please
e) None of the above
2. What are some of the most important aspects of ﬁeld hos-
pital operations?
a) Medically appropriate patient careb) Strong logistical support
c) Solid supply chain management
d) A & B
e) All of the above
3. As described in the article, what is one basic ethical princi-
pal of humanitarianism?
a) Disarming all comers onto hospital grounds
b) Treating all patients with respectful and compassion-
ate care based on need
c) Protecting yourself at all costs
d) Treating only civilians during a conﬂict
e) All of the aboveReferences
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